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THE INTERACTION OF AGRICULTURAL LAW AND
BANKRUPTCY LAW: A SURVEY OF RECENT CASES
SUSAN A. SCHNEIDER*
Financial stress such as that which brings parties to seek relief
in bankruptcy invariably produces competition both between the
debtor and his or her creditors and between creditors, as each
seeks a share of the limited assets that make up the bankruptcy
estate. In this context, the bankruptcy courts are asked to deter-
mine the rights of the parties, a determination that is likely to
require an interpretation of both bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy
law. In the cases involving agricultural interests, these determina-
tions may be particularly complex in that the court's ultimate deci-
sion may also be influenced by the special rules and exceptions
that characterize agricultural law.
This article presents a survey of some of the most significant
bankruptcy decisions published in 1991 which affect agriculture
and agricultural interests. It focuses primarily on the appellate
decisions by the circuit courts, but also provides mention of the
most controversial or novel agricultural law issues addressed by
the bankruptcy courts. Although most of the cases discussed
involve farm bankruptcies, some involve the farmer in the position
of creditor rather than debtor. While concerns for space and san-
ity permit only a discussion of the highlights of the year, an effort
has been made to refer, through footnote citation, to as many cases
as possible.
The first section of the article addresses issues fundamental to
all types of bankruptcy. These issues include the application of the
automatic stay and the characterization of property as property of
the bankruptcy estate. Both of these issues address the application
of a specific provision of the Bankruptcy Code to a case involving
agricultural interests.
The second section discusses issues that integrate bankruptcy
law and nonbankruptcy issues. In these cases, the bankruptcy
courts are asked to interpret state law and/or nonbankruptcy fed-
eral law as presented in the bankruptcy forum. Issues addressed
include state law issues dealing with the validity and priority of
security interests and state law exemption rights. Also addressed
* Of counsel, Anderson & Bailly, Fargo, North Dakota. Appreciation is extended to
Christopher R. Kelley for his support and encouragement.
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are two federal statutes, the Agricultural Credit Act of 19871 and
the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act.2
The third section discusses special issues presented in farm
reorganization. Issues addressed include the recent Supreme
Court ruling on the combination of Chapter 7 and 13 bankruptcies
as well as the requirements for obtaining relief in Chapter 12
bankruptcy.
The final section addresses the issues of dischargeability and
dismissal. A number of cases that address fraud and improper
activities by debtors are discussed.
I. FUNDAMENTAL BANKRUPTCY ISSUES
This section reviews cases involving issues specific to bank-
ruptcy law as applied in farm bankruptcies. The issues addressed
are the automatic stay and the definition of property of the estate.
Each is discussed as it relates to agricultural interests in
bankruptcy.
A. THE AUTOMATIC STAY
When a bankruptcy case is commenced, section 362 of the
Bankruptcy Code3 provides for the immediate imposition of an
automatic stay, designed to give the debtor "a breathing spell from
his creditors... [to permit] the debtor to attempt a repayment or
reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pres-
sures that drove him into bankruptcy."4 With few exceptions, this
stay prohibits any entity from taking action against the debtor.
The types of prohibited actions are specified in section 362(a) and
include the initiation or continuation of any attempt to obtain pos-
session of property, such as proceeding with foreclosure or
replevin.5 Thus, the general rule of section 362 is that all credi-
tors' actions of the kind specified in section 36 2(a) are stayed.
The impact of this stay is tempered, however, by various cred-
itor safeguards which balance the rights of creditors with those of
the debtor. Perhaps the most important such safeguard is the pro-
cedure for obtaining relief through the lifting of the stay. Section
1. Pub. L. No. 100-233, 101 Stat. 568 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 7 & 12
U.S.C.).
2. 7 U.S.C. §§ 499a-499t (1988).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
4. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 340 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6296-97.
5. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(aX1),(2),(3),(6) (1988).
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362(d) sets forth this procedure.' It authorizes the court to grant
relief from the stay, on request of a party in interest, in two situa-
tions. Relief may be granted under section 362(dXl) "for cause,
including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in prop-
erty of such party in interest."'7 Alternatively, relief may be
granted under section 362(dX2) if "the debtor does not have an
equity in such property," and "such property is not necessary for
an effective reorganization."'
In addition to the procedural safeguard for obtaining relief
from stay, there are also exceptions to the applicability of the stay.
These exceptions, set forth in section 362(b), delineate circum-
stances under which the otherwise prohibited activities will not be
stayed.9 In these instances, procedures against the debtor can pro-
ceed without interference from the bankruptcy court.
The applicability of the automatic stay, and the necessary
showing for obtaining relief from stay, are important issues in farm
bankruptcy as in almost all other bankruptcy cases. While it pro-
vides strong protection for farm debtors, as the courts have
recently emphasized, under certain circumstances this protection
will not be available. As is discussed below, in three cases pub-
lished this year, the Eighth Circuit addressed the automatic stay
issue and ruled in favor of the farmer's creditors.
In Production Credit Ass'n v. Wieseler (In re Wieseler),10 the
court reviewed the bankruptcy court's action in vacating its previ-
ous order lifting the automatic stay." The case involved a signed
stipulation between the farm debtors and their primary creditor,
Production Credit Association (PCA). 2 The stipulation contained
a "drop dead" clause whereby upon the debtors default, PCA
could petition the court for relief from the automatic stay and
obtain immediate possession of the debtors' secured property by
taking the deeds held in escrow with the bankruptcy court. Under
the facts presented in Wieseler, the debtors defaulted, and PCA
brought an ex parte motion for relief from stay. The bankruptcy
court urged settlement. Although it appears that partial settle-
ment may have been reached and, accordingly, the debtors made
partial payment, PCA again petitioned the court ex parte based on
6. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1988).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 362(dXl) (1988).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 362(dX2) (1988).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (1988).
10. 934 F.2d 965 (8th Cir. 1991).
11. Production Credit Ass'n v. Wieseler (In re Wieseler), 934 F.2d 965 (8th Cir. 1991).
12. id. at 966.
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the debtors' continued default. The bankruptcy court lifted the
stay. 3 The debtors then moved for reconsideration, alleging that
PCA had not informed the court of the ongoing settlement activi-
ties. The court reconsidered and vacated its order, thus leaving
the stay in place.1 4 Upon appeal by PCA, the district court
affirmed,1 5 but the Eighth Circuit court reversed.' 6
In rejecting the bankruptcy court's decision, the Eighth Cir-
cuit court found that the stipulation had been breached by the
debtor and that this breach was sufficient "cause" to mandate the
lifting of the stay. The court noted that if "cause" for purposes of
section 362(dX2) is found, the creditor is not required to prove that
the debtor does not have equity in the property.17 The court
rejected the bankruptcy court's reasoning that the original stipula-
tion may have placed too great a burden on the debtors, noting
that it was "loathe to interfere" with an agreement voluntarily
reached by the parties.' 8 On this basis, the court held that as a
"matter of justice and equity" the stay should have been lifted.19
In Farm Credit Bank v. Franzen °2 0 another Eighth Circuit rul-
ing on the automatic stay, the court also reversed the bankruptcy
court's ruling in favor of the farm debtors. In Franzen, the lender
had obtained relief from stay, enabling it to proceed with a state
law foreclosure action. Through this procedure the lender
obtained the decree of foreclosure and received a deed to the
property as high bidder at the sale. Nevertheless the debtor
refused to relinquish possession, so the lender returned to the
bankruptcy court, seeking relief from stay to enable it to use state
law remedies to obtain possession.2' The bankruptcy court
refused to lift the stay and instead ordered valuation hearings to
determine whether "reasonably equivalent value" had been given
for purposes of section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code,22 or whether
"fair consideration" under state law had been given pursuant to
sections 544 and 549.23
The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the bankruptcy
13. Id.
14. Id. at 966-67.
15. Id. at 967 (citing In re Wieseler, No. 89-4086, slip op. at 25-26 (D.S.D. Sept. 25,
1989)).
16. Id. at 968-69.
17. Id. at 968.
18. Id. at 967 (citation omitted).
19. Id. at 968.
20. 926 F.2d 762 (8th Cir. 1991).
21. Farm Credit Bank of Omaha v. Franzen, 926 F.2d 762, 762 (8th Cir. 1991).
22. Id. (referencing 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988)).
23. Id. (referencing 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 549 (1988)).
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court was precluded from reviewing the sale.24 The court noted
that the state courts had already reviewed the foreclosure process
and determined that it complied with state law, and as such, the
bankruptcy court was without authority to involve further
review.
A third appellate decision, the case of Erickson v. Polk,26 also
delineated the limits of the protection of the automatic stay in a
farm bankruptcy. This case, however, addressed an exception to
the stay. In Erickson, the Chapter 11 debtors alleged the violation
of the automatic stay by a lessor of unimproved farmland.2 ' The
debtors had leased the property in connection with their farming
operation for a term of one year.28 They filed their petition for
relief in bankruptcy during this term.29 Prior to the expiration of
the term, and subsequent to the filing of the bankruptcy petition,
the lessor notified the debtor in writing of the expiration date of
the lease and, subsequent to the expiration date, posted no tres-
passing signs on the property.3 0 The debtor filed a motion with
the bankruptcy court, arguing that the automatic stay had been
violated. 3'
The bankruptcy court held that a violation of the automatic
stay had not occurred, finding that the lessor's activities were
excepted from the application of the stay.32 On appeal, the district
court affirmed, and on further appeal the Eighth Circuit court also
affirmed. In support of its decision, the Eighth Circuit discussed
section 362(bX10), which provides a specific lessors' exception to
the automatic stay.33 This exception applies to lessors who take
possession of property subject to a nonresidential lease that has
terminated according to the stated term of the lease, a situation
applicable to the Erickson facts. The court also noted that under
state law, the lease had been correctly terminated, and there were
no grounds for finding a holdover tenancy.34 On this basis, the
court held that no violation of the automatic stay had occurred and
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 921 F.2d 200 (8th Cir. 1990).
27. Erickson v. Polk, 921 F.2d 200, 200-01 (8th Cir. 1990).
28. Id. at 201.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Erickson, 921 F.2d at 200-01.
32. Id. at 201 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(bX10) (1988)).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 201-02 (citing case law interpreting Nebraska state law on holdover
tenancies) (citations omitted).
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that the lease was terminated.35
Other decisions interpreting the automatic stay as applied to
farm bankruptcy have held that the automatic stay tolls the statute
of limitations for purposes of the enforcement of debt,36 that the
stay is inapplicable to actions commenced by the debtor,3 7 and
that the stay does apply to prohibit the post- petition election by
Commodity Credit Corporation to seize commodities under the
loan support program.38
B. PROPERTY OF THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE
Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code39 broadly provides for
the creation of an estate upon the commencement of a bank-
ruptcy. Commencement is accomplished by the filing of a bank-
ruptcy petition with the bankruptcy court.40 According to section
541, when the estate is created, with few exceptions, it is com-
prised of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property
as of the commencement of the case."' 4 1 It includes interests
"wherever located and by whomever held."' 42
In addition to a general definition of "property of the estate,"
section 541 also sets forth a listing of specific items that are to be
included. Of particular applicability to agricultural bankruptcies is
section 541(aX6)'s inclusion of "[p]roceeds, product, offspring,
rents, or profits of or from property of the estate, except such as
are earnings from services performed by an individual debtor
after the commencement of the case.' 4 3
35. Id.
36. See In re Brichat, 129 B.R. 235, 238 (D. Kan. 1991) (determining that the letters
from Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) to the debtor regarding the repayment of an
FmHA loan did not constitute an acceleration notice for purposes of the running of the
statute of limitations for the enforcement of a debt and holding, in addition, that the
automatic stay tolls the running of the statute of limitations for purposes of the enforcement
of a debt).
37. See Merchants & Farmers Bank v. Hill, 122 B.R. 539, 541 (E.D. Ark. 1990) (holding,
in part, that the automatic stay is inapplicable to actions originally commenced by the
debtor). See infra note 47.
38. See Commodity Credit Corp. v. Marlow (In re Julien Co.), 117 B.R. 910, 920-23
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1990) (holding that the title to cotton under the loan support program
does not pass to Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) until there has been a default on the
loan and CCC has made an election authorized by its regulations; this CCC election is
subject to the automatic stay, and CCC cannot make its election post-petition without
seeking relief from the stay). See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
39. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988).
40. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301-03 (1988).
41. 11 U.S.C. § 541(aXI) (1988).
42. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 541(aX6) (1988). The specific enumerations of interests within the
definition of property of the estate include several other items that transcend the general
-'commencement of a case" rule. For example, § 541(aX5) provides that certain properties
acquired by "bequest, devise, or inheritance" within 180 days of filing will be included. 11
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Although the definition of "property of the estate" is so broad
that it is seemingly all-inclusive, the variety of formally and infor-
mally held farm assets frequently results in litigation to determine
whether the property is, in fact, property of the estate. In most
cases, the property is included. For example, in recent decisions,
the courts have found herbicides that were returned to the debtor,
as agent of the manufacturer, to be property of the debtor's
estate.44  Similarly, cooperative dividends earned pre-petition, 45
elevator maintenance contracts, 46 and causes of action that the
debtor accrued prior to the bankruptcy 47 have been found to be
property of the estate.
One of the most interesting recent cases on this issue is the
case of Commodity Credit Corp. v. Marlow (In re Julien).48 In this
case, the definition of "property of the estate" arose in determin-
ing who holds title to the commodities underlying a nonrecourse
loan program contract.4 9 Under the federal farm program known
as the nonrecourse loan program, the program participant
receives a payment based on a set loan rate for the particular com-
modity. Although the participant holds the commodity, it is sub-
ject to a security interest in favor of the Commodity Credit
Corporation (CCC), and it may be informally referred to as CCC
grain. At the end of the loan term, the participant may either sell
the commodity and repay the CCC loan with interest or forfeit the
crop to the CCC. If the crop is forfeited, no additional payment is
required.5 0 The issue that affects the property of the estate deter-
mination is when title to the commodity vests in the CCC.
U.S.C. § 541(aX5) (1988). Similarly, § 541(aX7) calls for the inclusion of "[a]ny interest in
property that the estate acquires after the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(aX7) (1988).
44. See CIBA-Geigy Corp. v. Flo-Lizer, Inc. (In re Flo- Lizer, Inc.), 946 F.2d 1237 (6th
Cir. 1991) (holding that, under Ohio "sale or return law," herbicides shipped to the
manufacturer, pre-petition, were property of the estate).
45. See Holder v. Bennett (In re Bennett), 126 B.R. 869, 873 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991)
(holding that post-petition patronage dividends from cotton cooperative based on pre-
petition farming activities were property of the Chapter 7 estate).
46. See Drewes v. FM Da-Sota Elevator Co. (In re Da-sota Elevator Co.), 939 F.2d 654,
655-56 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that elevator maintenance contracts are not personal service
contracts, therefore they are property of the estate and ordinarily must be transferred for
reasonably equivalent value).
47. See Merchants & Farmers Bank v. Hill, 122 B.R. 539, 542 (E.D. Ark. 1990) (holding
in part that "'causes of action belonging to the debtor at the commencement of the
bankruptcy" become property of the estate). See supra note 37.
48. 117 B.R. 910 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1990).
49. Commodity Credit Corp. v. Marlow (In re Julien Co.), 117 B.R. 910, 919 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. 1990).
50. For an explanation of the loan support program, see ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERV.,
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., THE BASIC MECHANISMS OF U.S. FARM POLICY 14 (Misc. Pub. No.
1479, 1990); ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., THE 1990 FARM ACT AND
THE 1990 BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT 8-13 (Misc. Pub. No. 1489, 1990).
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In attempting to sort out the true nature of the loan program
and the transfer of title issue, the court in Julien thoroughly
examined the loan program contract and the applicable ASCS reg-
ulations.51 The court first addressed the issue of whether the pro-
gram participant receives a true loan or whether there is a
purchase of the commodity. As is required under the program,
the debtor in Julien signed a form note and security agreement
that incorporated the ASCS regulations in addition to reciting spe-
cific program requirements.52 Included among the contract's
terms was the ambiguous provision that the producer "sells,
assigns, and mortgages" the commodities to the CCC.53 As dis-
cussed by the court, other contract provisions repeatedly charac-
terized the transaction in terms appropriate for a loan and security
interest, not a sale of the commodities. The court concluded that
the cotton was collateral for a loan.54
The court next examined the contract and the regulations
providing for the commodity's passage of title to the CCC. The
contract attachments provided that the "title to the collateral will
vest in CCC on the day following the loan maturity date."'5 5 How-
ever, other contract provisions and the regulations provided for
participant redemption of the commodity and a specific procedure
to be followed if timely redemption is not made. 6 This procedure
requires the CCC to make an election to take title to the commod-
ity. After analyzing the election language and the testimony of
ASCS personnel, the Julien court determined that until the ASCS
makes the proper administrative election, title to the commodities
under the loan program remains in the producer. 57  If the pro-
ducer files bankruptcy before the ASCS has made its election, the
commodity becomes property of the bankruptcy estate.58
In some cases, however, the courts have found that the prop-
erty in question was not property of the estate. In Robbins v.
Comerica Bank-Detroit (In re Zwagerman),59 the court found that
51. Julien, 117 B.R. at 913-19.
52. Id. at 913-14.
53. Id. at 913.
54. Id. at 919.
55. Id. at 914 (citing The Commodity Credit Corporation Price Support Note and
Security Agreement Terms and Conditions, Form CCC-601, Apr. 27, 1988) (emphasis
added).
56. Julien, 117 B.R. at 914-15 (citing Form CCC-813 and 7 C.F.R. § 1427.22(aXl)
(1989)).
57. See id. at 924-25.
58. Id. at 919. See also Cook v. United States (In re Earl Roggenbuck Farms, Inc.), 51
B.R. 913, 921 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985) (holding that post-petition transfer of corn by the
CCC without a court order authorizing the transfer was an avoidable post-petition transfer).
59. 125 B.R. 486 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
316 [Vol. 68:309
AGRICULTURAL LAW AND BANKRUPTCY
cattle held under a custom feeding arrangement were not prop-
erty of the estate in that they were held pursuant to a bailment
relationship and title remained in the bailor.6" The court deter-
mined that section 2-326 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which
applies to goods that are held by another for sale, was inapplicable
because the cattle were not delivered for sale, but only for custom
feeding.6 1
The court in Farm Credit Bank v. Halverson (In re Solberg) 6 2
also addressed the issue of property of the estate, finding an asset
that did not fit into this broad category. In this case, the court held
that neither the Minnesota state right of first refusal nor the fed-
eral right of first refusal that attaches to property foreclosed by a
Farm Credit System (FCS) lender was property of the debtor's
Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate.63
Under the facts of Solberg, the debtor's property had been
foreclosed prior to the bankruptcy filing, but the state law
redemption period expired after the filing. After reviewing the
applicable state statutes, the court determined that under Minne-
sota law, title to the foreclosed property does not vest in the pur-
chaser at the foreclosure sale (here, the foreclosing lender) until
the expiration of the redemption period.6 Thus, as of the com-
mencement of the case, the debtor held title to the foreclosed
property.
With regard to the Minnesota state law right of first refusal,
the court in Solberg found that this law regulates the lender's post-
foreclosure sale or lease of the property and essentially provides
the debtor an opportunity to match an offer and regain the prop-
60. Robbins v. Comerica Bank-Detroit (In re Zwagerman), 125 B.R. 486, 489-90 (W.D.
Mich. 1991).
61. Id. at 490-92.
62. 125 B.R. 1010 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991).
63. Farm Credit Bank v. Halverson (In re Solberg), 125 B.R. 1010, 1014-15 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1991). The fact that this was a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case is critical to the court's
holding. Section 541's definition of property of the estate applies to bankruptcies filed
under either Chapter 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. In these cases, property of the estate
is primarily determined as of the filing of the bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 541(aX1) (1988).
Although proceeds and the like may also be included, such property is generally derived
from property that is in existence as of the commencement of the case. 11 U.S.C. § 541(aX6)
(1988). In contrast, in bankruptcies filed under either Chapter 12 or 13, the estate consists
of all property described in § 541(a) plus like described property that is acquired by the
debtor between the commencement of the case and its closure, dismissal, or conversion.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1207 (1988) (property of the estate for purposes of Chapter 12 cases); 11
U.S.C. § 1306 (1988) (property of the estate for purposes of Chapter 13 cases). Thus, the
definition of the types of properties included is the same in Chapters 7, 11, 12, and 13, but
the time period for acquisition is extended in Chapter 12 and 13 cases. In Solberg, had the
issue arisen in a Chapter 12 or 13 bankruptcy, the right presumably would have been
property of the estate.
64. Solberg, 125 B.R. at 1015 (citations omitted).
1992]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
erty.65 Accordingly, the court determined that the debtor's state
law right of first refusal attaches at the time that a third-party offer
is received by the lender.66 Under the Solberg facts, at the time
that the debtor filed the bankruptcy and the Chapter 7 estate was
created, the lender did not have title to the property, nor had any
third-party bids been received. The court thus found that the
right came into existence post-petition and was not part of the
bankruptcy estate.6 7
With regard to the federal right of first refusal, mandated by
the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987,68 the court found that the fed-
eral right of first refusal under the FCS provisions of this Act arises
when FCS lender acquires the property.69 Again turning to Min-
nesota state foreclosure law, as FCS would not acquire title until
after the expiration of the redemption period, the right of first
refusal could not arise until that point in time. Thus, the right
arose post-petition and was not part of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy
estate.7°
Thus, while property of the estate is an expansive category
that encompasses most property associated with the debtor, cer-
tain types of property are excluded. Agriculture presents exam-
ples of these potential exclusions.
The categories of the automatic stay and the property of the
estate encompass most of the recent cases that address agricultural
interests in the context of a specific interpretation of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. These cases are of particular importance in that
these two categories present such fundamental aspects of a bank-
ruptcy. Readers are cautioned, however, that additional decisions
interpreting specific sections of the Code can also be found. 1
II. NONBANKRUPTCY ISSUES PRESENTED IN THE
BANKRUPTCY FORUM
The cases discussed to this point have addressed fundamental
65. Id. at 1019-20.
66. Id. at 1020-21.
67. Id. at 1021.
68. Pub. L. No. 100-233, 101 Stat. 568 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 7 & 12
U.S.C.).
69. Solberg, 125 B.R. at 1013-16.
70. Id.
71. For example, in the case of State Bank v. Bucyrus Grain Co., Inc. (In re Bucyrus
Grain Co., Inc.), 127 B.R. 45 (D. Kan. 1988), appeal dismissed, 905 F.2d 1362 (10th Cir.
1991), the court found a grain elevator to be a "futures commission merchant" despite the
fact that it did not receive a commission. The farmers who purchased futures contracts
through the elevator were "customers" entitled to special protection under §§ 761 and 766
of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 50-51.
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bankruptcy issues. In addition, however, the bankruptcy courts
are frequently asked to rule on issues that are not intrinsically
bankruptcy related and that call for nonbankruptcy law interpre-
tations. These interpretations may require the bankruptcy courts
to examine the interaction of bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy law,
or they may call for a straight interpretation of a nonbankruptcy
law issue. In either case, the nonbankruptcy law issue, such as the
validity of security interests or the remedies available to sellers
under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, may tran-
scend the bankruptcy forum, essentially creating law applicable in
other forums.
With regard to an interpretation of state law, two issues have
been addressed by numerous bankruptcy courts. These are the
issues of the debtor's right to exemptions and the validity of secur-
ity interests. While the courts have also addressed other issues,72
these issues have produced the most significant decisions overall.
A. EXEMPTIONS
One area where bankruptcy law and nonbankruptcy state law
interact is the area of exemptions. The Bankruptcy Code provides
that a debtor may either exempt property from the bankruptcy
estate under the applicable state law exemption statutes or, unless
state law prohibits, the federal exemption scheme.73
Regardless of which is chosen, the debtor will be bound by
certain bankruptcy rules, and within the context of these rules, the
bankruptcy court will interpret the exemption law chosen.74
On this basis, many of the decisions in agricultural bankrupt-
cies involve the bankruptcy court interpreting state exemption
statutes as applied in bankruptcy. Among the recent opinions on
72. See, e.g., Heartline Farms, Inc. v. Daly, 934 F.2d 985 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that
under Nebraska law, an installment sale land contract is a security device rather than an
executory contract; holding that the installment land contract must be judicially foreclosed
and that strict foreclosure will not be permitted).
73. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988).
74. For an example of a bankruptcy rule affecting both state and federal exemptions,
see In re Kingsbury, 124 B.R. 146 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991). The court in Kingsbury addressed
the effect of an untimely objection to a debtor's claimed exemption, an issue that could
affect either a state or federally based exemption. The court held that the objection would
be considered, but only to determine whether a good faith statutory basis existed for the
exemption. As such, the court followed the line of cases that have held that an exemption
claim that has no statutory basis can be denied despite an untimely objection. Other courts,
however, have held that once the time period for objecting to exemptions has run, the
property is deemed exempt. This approach was recently articulated by the Third Circuit in
Taylor v. Feeland & Kronz, 938 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 632 (1991).
The Supreme Court has accepted certiorari in the Taylor case in order to resolve this
conflict. Taylor, 112 S. Ct. 632 (1991).
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this issue are cases interpreting the requirements for claiming a
homestead exemption under Texas law,75 the restrictions on claim-
ing a partnership property exemption under Iowa law,76 and the
definition of the "tools of the trade" exemption under Texas law.77
Although some of the cases may have limited utility outside
the particular state of applicability, sometimes there are principles
that can be transferred to other similar exemption statutes under
other settings. For example, the Seventh Circuit case of In re
Szekely 7 s may have widespread applicability. Szekely involved a
value-based homestead exemption under Illinois law. According
to this exemption statute, each person is "entitled to an estate of
homestead to the extent in value of $7500." 79 The Szekelys filed
for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code and claimed
their full entitlement to this exemption for a total homestead value
of $15,000.0 Their home was worth and eventually was sold for
approximately $135,000 and was subject to two mortgages.8 1 The
Szekelys continued to reside in their home after filing the bank-
ruptcy, but did not make any payments on either of the mort-
gages.8 2 It was not disputed that the value of the homestead, in
excess of the amount claimed exempt, was property of the estate. 3
The trustee alleged that the estate should be entitled to
receive rental payments for the fair rental value of the home from
the Szekelys. He proposed that these rental payments be
deducted from the homestead exemption, diminishing the amount
the debtors would realize upon the eventual sale of the property.
Both the bankruptcy court and the district court agreed with this
75. See In re Mitchell, 132 B.R. 553 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991) (holding that the Texas
rural homestead exemption does not require demonstration of economic use of the
homestead property; the person claiming exemption must demonstrate a possessory
interest in the land, the intent to claim it as a homestead, and use for some purpose as a
home; although economic use is one permissible purpose, other possibilities include shelter,
protection, comfort, convenience, and enjoyment); In re Bohac, 117 B.R. 256 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1990) (discussing the abandonment of a prior homestead and the creation of a new
homestead under Texas law; debtor was found to not have met the necessary burden of
proof in establishing rural homestead).
76. See In re Indvik, 118 B.R. 993, 1003-04 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1990) (holding, in part,
that under Iowa law, an individual cannot claim partnership property as exempt).
77. See In re Sugarek, 117 B.R. 271 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1990) (finding that a tractor,
planter and disk are tools of the trade necessary for the operation of the debtor's farming
business and holding that the debtor is allowed to exempt this equipment).
78. 936 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1991).
79. In re Szekely, 936 F.2d 897,899 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 110, 12-
901, 12-1201).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 899-900.
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reasoning and set the amount of rent at $600 per month- 4 As the
Szekelys resided in the home for eight months prior to its sale,
their accumulated rental charges totaled $4800, which reduced
their homestead exemption to $10,200.5
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit court noted that the issue
presented was a "surprisingly fundamental, and difficult question"
on which the court was unable to find any authority.8 6 The court
further noted that the trustee would clearly be authorized to pay
the debtors the amount of their claimed exemption ($15,000) and
evict them from the house.8 7 However, when the court analyzed
the "fresh start" that Chapter 7 promises to debtors8 and the pur-
pose of the homestead exemption, 9 the court found the trustee's
rental charge unacceptable. The court found that it had the effect
of forcing the debtors to attempt to maintain a lifestyle they could
no longer afford.90 The court analogized the relationship between
the bankruptcy estate and the debtors to the relationship between
tenants in common, noting that "[n]either tenant can charge the
other rent, but either can demand that the property be parti-
tioned between them." 91 On this basis, the court stated that the
trustee was entitled to obtain sole rights to the property by paying
the debtors the amount of their exemption, but that until he
acquired sole rights, he could not interfere with the debtors' pos-
session. The court held that the Illinois homestead exemption
"entitles the debtor to remain in his home rent free until he
receives the cash value of the exemption."
92
B. SECURITY INTERESTS AND STATUTORY LIEN RIGHTS
Another area where the bankruptcy courts are frequently
asked to interpret state law is with regard to liens and security
interests. This interpretation is important in bankruptcy because
the rights of the creditors may well be determined by, if not lim-
ited to, their status as secured creditors. Frequently the bank-
84. Id. at 899.
85. Id.
86. Szekely, 936 F.2d at 898.
87. Id. at 902.
88. Id. at 901.
89. Id. at 903 (noting that the homestead exemption is "designed to assist the debtor to
the extent of the exemption to obtain more modest living quarters.").
90. Szekely, 936 F.2d at 903.
91. Id. (citations omitted).
92. Id. Under the facts of Szekely, the homestead was worth more than the
encumbrances against it. In a situation where there was insufficient equity to support the
exemption, presumably, the estate would abandon its interest and the lender would
foreclose, eventually evicting the debtor.
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ruptcy decisions involve an interpretation of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) as adopted by the state. These decisions
generally involve the application of little or no bankruptcy law as
such.
For example, in Citizens National Bank and Trust Co. v. Serel-
son (In re Burkhart Farm and Livestock),93 the court was called
upon to interpret UCC sections 9-203 and 9-110 as adopted in
Wyoming to determine the validity of a creditor's security inter-
est.94 The court held that the security agreement which referred
to crops growing "in and around" specific property was vague and
did not reasonably identify crops growing on unspecified contigu-
ous sections of property.95
Similarly, in United States v. Georgia Vegetables Co., Inc.96
the court was asked to determine whether a creditor's financing
statement was sufficient, applying UCC section 9-402 as adopted in
Georgia.9" There, the court found that the listing of the husband,
acting as an agent for the wife/owner, as owner of the property on
the financing statement was minor error and not seriously
misleading. 98
Other cases involve the validity of a state statutory lien law.
These cases may involve a determination as to the validity of the
lien, or they may arise in the face of the trustee in bankruptcy's
special avoidance power. Section 545 of the Bankruptcy Code
allows the trustee to avoid statutory liens to the extent that they
would be unenforceable against a bona fide purchaser.9 9 Thus, in
addition to determining the status of the lienholder, the bank-
ruptcy court is frequently asked to determine whether a creditor's
statutory lien will withstand trustee avoidance.
The Eighth Circuit addressed this issue in the recent case of
Drewes v. Carter (In re Woods Farmers Cooperative Elevator
Co.).100 This case concerned the North Dakota statute that creates
a lien in favor of producers who store grain at a warehouse or grain
93. 938 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1991).
94. Citizens Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Serelson (In re Burkhart Farm and Livestock),
938 F.2d 1114, 1115-16 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Wyo. STAT. §§ 34.1-9-203(aXi), 34.1-9-110
(1991)).
95. Id. at 1116.
96. 123 B.R. 456 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1990).
97. United States v. Georgia Vegetables Co., Inc., 123 B.R. 456 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1990)
(citing O.C.G.A. § 11-9-402).
98. Id. at 461.
99. 11 U.S.C. § 545(2) (1988).
100. 946 F.2d 1411 (8th Cir. 1991).
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elevator.'' The court held that the trustee was not allowed to
avoid the statutory liens held by the farmers in this case, because
the North Dakota statute provides that the lien is enforceable
against all but buyers in the ordinary course of business. 0 2 The
lien can be enforced against a bona fide purchaser unless he or she
meets the "additional buyer in the ordinary course" standard.10 3
Therefore, because the section 545 test was not met, the trustee
was not allowed to avoid the liens. 104
Other decisions involving statutory liens have interpreted the
producer's lien under California state law,' 05 the preparer's lien
under Washington state law,' 0 6 and the Indiana agister's lien.'0 7
C. THE AGRICULTURAL CREDIT ACT OF 1987
In addition to interpreting state statutes, the bankruptcy court
may be called upon to construe a nonbankruptcy federal statute.
Among the federal statutes that have been addressed in recent
agricultural bankruptcy cases is the Agricultural Credit Act of
1987 (the Act).' 0 8 This statute, passed as a direct result of the eco-
nomic crisis of the farm economy,' °9 creates a variety of rights for
farm borrowers with Farmers' Home Administration (FmHA) or
FCS lenders. 110 Some of these rights have been interpreted in
bankruptcy litigation."'
The most significant recent case involving the Act in a bank-
ruptcy context was the Eighth Circuit case of Lee v. Yeutter. 12
101. Drewes v. Carter (In re Woods Farmers Coop. Elevator Co.), 946 F.2d 1411, 1413
(8th Cir. 1991) (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 60-02-25.1 (1985)).
102. Id. at 1414.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See In re T.H. Richards Processing Co., 910 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that
neither an agreement to accept deferred payments for produce nor a demand-payment
arrangement acts to automatically release the producer's state law lien under California
producer's lien statute; moreover, the transfer of produce to a warehouseman pursuant to a
non-negotiable warehouse receipt does not defeat the producer's lien).
106. See In re Young, 127 B.R. 456 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1991) (holding that a creditor
who provided grain to a dairy farmer in chapter 12 bankruptcy was not a "producer"
entitled to protection under the Washington statutory "preparer's lien" statute).
107. See Stookey Holsteins, Inc. v. Van Voorst (In re Stookey Holsteins, Inc.), 117 B.R.
402 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989) (finding that a cattle boarder holds a state law agister's lien on
cattle turned over to the Chapter 11 debtor despite the failure of the lienholder to issue a
receipt notifying the debtor of its right to sell the cattle to pay charges; interpreting the
statute as requiring the issuance of a receipt only to authorize sale and not as a requirement
for the creation of the lien rights).
108. Pub. L. No. 100-233, 101 Stat. 568 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 7 & 12
U.S.C.).
109. Farm Credit Bank v. Halverson (In re Solberg), 125 B.R. at 1010, 1013 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1991).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. 917 F.2d 1104 (8th Cir. 1990).
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This case concerned FmHA borrowers who received a discharge
in bankruptcy prior to the Act. At issue was whether these farm-
ers were still "borrowers" for purposes of the Act.1 13 If they were
"borrowers," they would be eligible for the debt restructuring
consideration mandated by the Act.11 4 In general terms, the Act
directs FmHA to restructure the debt of eligible borrowers,
enabling them to keep possession of their farms if they can estab-
lish that restructuring will produce as much or more income for
FmHA than would foreclosure. 1 5 The plaintiffs in Lee wanted to
be considered for this restructuring because despite their dis-
charge in bankruptcy, FmHA still held mortgages on their farms
and threatened foreclosure.' 16 These farmers remained in posses-
sion of their mortgaged property and had requested restructuring
consideration from FmHA." 7 The FmHA took the position, how-
ever, that these farmers were no longer borrowers and, as such,
were ineligible for consideration.' 8
The case arose under the Administrative Procedure Act as a
challenge to the FmHA regulations. The Eighth Circuit stated
that the appropriate analysis involved a two-part inquiry." 9 The
first question is "whether Congress has directly spoken on the
[issue]."' 2 0 If not, the court proceeds to the second inquiry,
whether the agency's regulation is "based on a permissible con-
struction of the statute.'' 1
Applying this analysis to the facts of Lee, the court first found
that Congress had not demonstrated a clear indication as to
whether farmers such as the Lees who had received a discharge in
bankruptcy should be considered under the debt restructuring
provisions of the Act.' 22 On this basis, the court limited itself to a
113. Lee v. Yeutter, 917 F.2d 1104, 1106 (8th Cir. 1990). The court noted that the
critical issue under the statutory definition of borrower set forth in 7 U.S.C. § 1991(bXl)
(1988) is the meaning of the term "obligation." The court stated, "This case hinges on the
Secretary's interpretation of one of the words Congress used to define a borrower;
specifically, the term 'obligation.'" Id.
114. Id. at 1105-06 (citing 7 U.S.C. §§ 1991(bX1), 1991(bX3) (1988)). At issue in Lee was
the farmers' eligibility for the category of programs termed the primary loan servicing
programs. The farmers' eligibility for the secondary loan servicing programs was not at
issue. Id.
115. Id. at 1105 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2001(a) (1988)).
116. Id.
117. Lee, 917 F.2d at 1106.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
122. Lee, 917 F.2d at 1107.
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review of whether the agency's determination was permissible.' 23
It held that even though agency's interpretation was not the only
one which could be reasonable, the FmHA agency interpretation
was permissible.' 24
The court addressed the Act as applied to FCS lenders in
Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul v. Halverson (In re Solberg).12 5 This
decision provided a detailed analysis of the right of first refusal
under the Act. The FCS alleged that the Act allowed it to sell
property at public auction and avoid at least a portion of the right
of first refusal provisions afforded to a former owner.'2 6 Following
Payne v. Federal Land Bank,127 the court rejected the FCS posi-
tion and held that FCS must make a private right of first refusal
offering to the former owner before it could sell the property by
public auction.' 28
Although the issue is now far from controversial, 2 9 in another
bankruptcy decision under the Act, the Eighth Circuit court con-
firmed that there is no private right of action for borrowers to sue
FCS lenders under the Act.13° The United States Supreme Court
refused to review this decision. 131
Another issue arising in bankruptcy is the interaction of the
borrower's rights provisions of the Act and the Bankruptcy Code.
Although cases such as Solberg' 32 addressed the rights that the
borrower retains after bankruptcy filing, another case held that
under a confirmed Chapter 12 plan, the plan terms control and
any provisions of the Act are irrelevant.' 33
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1108 (citation omitted).
125. 125 B.R. 1010 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991). See supra note 62 and the accompanying
text.
126. Farm Credit Bank v. Halverson (In re Solberg), 125 B.R. 1010, 1017 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1991).
127. 916 F.2d 179, 181 (4th Cir. 1990).
128. Solberg, 125 B.R. at 1017-19.
129. See, e.g., Saltzman v. Farm Credit Servs., 950 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1991); Zajac v.
Federal Land Bank, 909 F.2d 1181 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc); Griffin v. Federal Land Bank,
902 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1990); Harper v. Federal Land Bank, 878 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1057 (1990) (each finding no private cause of action for borrowers to
sue an FCS lender for violations of the Agricultural Credit Act).
130. Euerle Farms v. Farm Credit Systems, 928 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 179 (1991).
131. Euerle Farms, 112 S. Ct. 179 (1991).
132. 125 B.R. 1010 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991).
133. Farm Credit Bank v. Coleman (In re Coleman), 125 B.R. 621 (Bankr. D. Mont.
1991) (holding that the confirmed Chapter 12 plan that incorporated the right of first
refusal under Montana state law was controlling; holding that the parties are bound to the
terms of the plan and that additional statutory provisions such as those in the Act are
irrelevant).
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D. THE PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES ACT
Another nonbankruptcy federal law that is frequently inter-
preted in the context of bankruptcy proceedings is the Perishable
Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA).134 This statute provides
various protections for sellers of perishable agricultural commodi-
ties. Perhaps the most powerful of these protections is the crea-
tion of a nonsegregated statutory trust that automatically arises in
favor of sellers of these commodities. 35 The perishable agricul-
tural commodities received by produce dealers, commission
merchants, and brokers, together with "all inventories of food or
other products derived from perishable agricultural commodities,
and any receivables or proceeds from the sale of such commodities
or products" are held in trust for the benefit of all unpaid sellers
and suppliers until they are fully paid for the commodities sold.
136
To preserve the benefits of the trust, the seller or supplier must
give timely notice to the purchaser of the commodities and the
Secretary of Agriculture.1
37
The existence and extent of the PACA statutory trust are
issues that are likely to arise in bankruptcy cases filed by the pur-
chasers of agricultural commodities. It is now settled law that if
the trust exists, it is separate from the bankruptcy and does not
become property of the bankruptcy estate.' 38 This elevates the
unpaid sellers from the lowly status of unsecured creditors to the
favored status of pro-rata shareholders in the trust assets. Because
this can be such a powerful remedy, it is frequently the subject of
litigation.
In recent cases that have dealt with the PACA trust, the issue
of what assets are included in this trust has been addressed. As an
indication of how broadly the trust may be construed, one court
held that the trust included accounts receivable from the debtor's
intrastate commodity transactions because they were the type of
commodity typically sold in interstate commerce. 139 Similarly,
another court recently held that assets purchased by the commod-
134. 7 U.S.C. §§ 499a-499t (1988).
135. 7 U.S.C. § 499e(cX2) (1988).
136. Id.
137. 7 U.S.C. § 499e(cX3) (1988).
138. See, e.g., C & E Enterprises, Inc. v. Milton Poulos, Inc. (In re Poulos), 107 B.R. 715
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989).
139. Bank of Los Angeles v. Official PACA Creditors' Comm. (In re Southland &
Keystone), 132 B.R. 632 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the PACA statutory trust
included accounts receivable from debtors' intrastate perishable agricultural commodity
transactions because the commodities were the type typically sold in interstate commerce;
finding therefore that the PACA claimants, as opposed to secured creditor, were entitled to
these proceeds).
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ity buyer/ debtor while the PACA trust fund was in existence were
presumed to have been purchased with trust funds.140  As such,
the truck and equipment purchased by debtor after the trust had
arisen were held to be part of trust fund assets rather than prop-
erty of the bankruptcy estate.14 1 On a related issue, however,
another court held that the trust assets cannot be traced to a third
party who had no knowledge of the character of the funds
received. 1
4 2
In addition, there are two recent PACA cases of interest that
enlarge the significance of the trust in other ways. In the case of C
& E Enterprises, Inc. v. Milton Poulos, Inc. (In re Milton
Poulos),'43 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Bank-
ruptcy Appellate Panel and ordered that attorneys fees were to be
paid from the trust fund. In the case of Tom Lange Co., Inc. v.
Stout (In re Stout,144 the bankruptcy court held that the PACA
trust satisfies the fiduciary capacity requirement of section
523(aX4) of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, failure to pay for
the purchase of produce is a defalcation under section 523(aX4)
and the debt to the seller protected by PACA is non-
dischargeable. 45
As is apparent from this wide variety of cases, bankruptcy liti-
gation frequently transcends the traditional notions of bankruptcy
law and the application of the Bankruptcy Code. In many bank-
ruptcy cases, the courts are asked to construe and apply nonban-
kruptcy law, and in so doing, these courts make law that can be,
and is, applied in nonbankruptcy forums.' 46
140. In re Atlantic Tropical Market Corp., 118 B.R. 139 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
141. Id. at 142.
142. Lyng v. JDC Enterprises, 117 B.R. 268 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (holding that PACA trust
assets cannot be recovered from third parties who had no knowledge of the character of the
funds received). See also Woeiner Produce Co., Inc. v. So Good Potato Chip Co. (In re So
Good Potato Chip Co.), 124 B.R. 298 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991) (holding that the nine-month
statute of limitations for the initiation of administrative proceedings under PACA does not
apply to the initiation of judicial proceedings in district court; PACA creates a trust
relationship between the seller and buyer of perishable agricultural commodities for
payment for the goods sold, but it does not create a trust relationship between the seller
and a third party buyer that does not have privity of contract with the seller).
143. 947 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curium).
144. 123 B.R. 412, 415 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1990).
145. Tom Lange Co., Inc. v. Stout (In re Stout), 123 B.R. 412, 415 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1990).
146. As an example of another situation in which the bankruptcy court is asked to
construe nonbankruptcy law, see Lee v. Bartlett and Co., 121 B.R. 872 (D. Kan. 1990)
(holding that a grain storage agreement can be found even in the absence of a warehouse
receipt; interpreting the federal law that requires issuance of a warehouse receipt in
storage arrangements as not precluding a finding of a storage agreement when a warehouse
receipt is not issued; and holding that the custom and practice of the parties can support a
finding that storage charges were to be deducted from the sale proceeds for the grain).
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III. FARM REORGANIZATION ISSUES
Many cases were decided in the farm reorganization arena
during the last year. Some involved reorganizations under Chap-
ter 12 bankruptcy, the Chapter designed specifically for the reor-
ganization of family farms.' 47 Others, however, involved farmers
attempting to reorganize their operations under Chapters 11 or
13. This section of the article discusses the most notable of these
decisions.
A. RESTRUCTURING MORTGAGE DEBT: JOHNSON V. HOME
STATE BANK
Perhaps the most significant farm reorganization decision of
the year was a Supreme Court decision involving a Chapter 13
bankruptcy. In Johnson v. Home State Bank, 48 the Supreme
Court resolved a split in the circuits on the issue of the whether a
mortgage obligation that survives a Chapter 7 bankruptcy dis-
charge can be reorganized in a subsequent Chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy. Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, held that
under the applicable bankruptcy law, a mortgage obligation was a
"claim" and, as such, could be restructured under a Chapter 13
plan, provided that other Chapter 13 requirements are met. 149
The facts in Johnson involved farm property that was mort-
gaged to the Home State Bank (the Bank).150 After the mortgagor,
Mr. Johnson, defaulted on his promissory notes to the Bank, the
bank initiated foreclosure proceedings.' While these proceed-
ings were pending, Johnson filed for relief under Chapter 7 of
the Bankruptcy Code and eventually received a discharge.' 5 2
Although this discharge relieved Johnson of personal liability on
his notes to the Bank, the Bank's in rem right to proceed against
the farm pursuant to the mortgage obligation survived.15 3 Accord-
ingly, after the automatic stay was lifted, the Bank re-initiated
foreclosure proceedings.' 5 4 After state court litigation, the Bank
eventually obtained an in rem judgment against the mortgaged
property. 15 5 A foreclosure sale pursuant to the in rem judgment
147. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, tit. II, § 255, 100 Stat., 3105-3113 (1986).
148. 111 S. Ct. 2150 (1991).
149. Johnson v. Home State Bank, 111 S. Ct. 2150, 2156 (1991).
150. Id. at 2152.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See 11 U.S.C. § 5 2 2 (cX2 ) (1988).
154. Johnson, 111 S. Ct. at 2152.
155. Id.
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was scheduled, but prior to this sale, Johnson filed for relief under
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.156 Although Johnson's first
reorganization plan was rejected by the bankruptcy court as not
feasible, Johnson went on to file an amended plan that treated the
mortgage as a claim against the estate and proposed a payment
plan equal to the Bank's in rem judgment.1 7 The bankruptcy
court confirmed this amended plan over the Bank's objection.' 5
The Bank appealed the plan confirmation, presenting alterna-
tive arguments. First, it argued that the Bankruptcy Code does
not allow a debtor to use Chapter 13 to reorganize a mortgage
obligation for which personal liability has been discharged. 15 9 The
Bank reasoned that while Chapter 13 provides for the reorganiza-
tion of creditors' claims against the debtor, there was no longer
any recognized claim because the debtor's personal liability had
been discharged. 160 Second, the Bank argued that Johnson's plan
had not been filed in good faith and that it was not feasible.'
The district court reversed, holding that the Bankruptcy Code
did not permit Johnson to reorganize the obligation to the
Bank.'6 2 It found that Chapter 13 authorizes the reorganization of
"claims" and then noted that the Code defines a "claim" as a
"right to payment.' 63 The court reasoned that when a mortgage
obligation is discharged, only the lien is retained. There is no
longer any right to payment, only a right to the property. Thus,
the mortgagee no longer holds a "claim" capable of reorganization
and is no longer a creditor of the debtor.164
The Tenth Circuit affirmed. 6 5 This affirmance created a split
in the circuits on the issue, with the Eleventh and the Ninth Cir-
cuits holding that a mortgage lien that is not supported by per-
sonal liability, because a Chapter 7 discharge is still a claim for
purposes of Chapter 13 reorganization.' 66
According to the Court, Johnson presented a straightforward
issue-whether an in rem mortgage interest, without in personam
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Johnson, 111 S. Ct. at 2152.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. id. (citing In re Johnson, 96 B.R. 326, 328-30 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1989)).
163. Johnson, 96 B.R. at 330 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)).
164. Id.
165. In re Johnson, 904 F.2d 563 (10th Cir. 1990).
166. See Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Saylors (In re Saylors), 869 F.2d 1434, 1436 (11th
Cir. 1989); Downey Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Metz (In re Metz), 820 F.2d 1495, 1498 (9th
Cir. 1987) (each permitting the inclusion of a mortgage lien in a Chapter 13 reorganization
plan despite the debtor's discharge from personal liability on the mortgage debt).
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liability, is a "claim" subject to inclusion in a Chapter 13 reorgani-
zation. 167 In reaching its decision, the Court relied primarily on
the definition of "claim" found in the Bankruptcy Code. The
Court cited its previous ruling on this definition for the proposition
that "Congress intended . . . the broadest available definition
.... "168 The Court also noted that in Pennsylvania Department
of Public Welfare v. Davenport, they had concluded that "'right
to payment' [means] nothing more nor less than an enforceable
obligation.' '1 69
Based on this broad definition, the Court concluded that a
mortgage holder has a "right to payment" even after the personal
liability on the debt has been discharged. 170 This "right to pay-
ment" can be found in the mortgage holder's right to the proceeds
of the sale of the mortgaged property. Alternatively, because the
Code also defines a "claim" as a "right to an equitable remedy for
breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to pay-
ment," the Court noted that the surviving right to foreclose can be
considered a "right to an equitable remedy" based on the debtor's
default.' 7 1
On that basis, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of
appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. 172
Because neither the district court nor the court of appeals had
addressed the alternative objections of the Bank regarding good
faith and feasibility, the Court directed the lower court to consider
them on remand.17 3
While the long range impact of Johnson is difficult to predict,
the filing of a reorganization bankruptcy under either Chapter 12
or 13 may be an option that will now be considered by discharged
farmers who wish to reorganize the debt on their mortgaged
homestead property. This option may be particularly appealing to
FmHA debtors who are ineligible for debt restructuring because
of their discharge. 174
167. Johnson, 111 S. Ct. at 2153.
168. Id. at 2154 (citing Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 110 S. Ct.
2126 (1990)).
169. Johnson, 111 S. Ct. at 2154 (quoting Davenport, 110 S. Ct. at 2131).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 2156.
173. Id.
174. See Lee v. Yeutter, 917 F.2d 1104 (8th Cir. 1990); Drewes v. Carter (In re Woods
Farmers Coop. Elevator Co.), 946 F.2d 1411 (8th Cir. 1991).
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B. ELIGIBILITY FOR CHAPTER 12 REORGANIZATION
Chapter 12 offers significant powers to the debtor-powers
that may not be available under other bankruptcy chapters.'
7 5
For this reason, the issue of whether a debtor meets the specific
eligibility requirements is frequently litigated.
Only a "family farmer with regular annual income" is eligible
for Chapter 12 relief.'7 6 The term "family farmer" is defined in
section 101(17) of the Bankruptcy Code, with specific require-
ments for individuals177 and similar, but distinct, requirements for
partnerships and corporations. 178  In general terms, section 101
requires that in order to be a "family farmer," the debtor must be
engaged in farming, have debts below the maximum amount of
total debt, have the requisite percentage of debt stem from the
farming operation, have the requisite percentage of income arise
from the farming operation and, if a partnership or corporation,
175. For example, under Chapter 12 there is no "absolute priority rule" as exists under
Chapter 11. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(bX2XBXii) (1988). The "absolute priority rule," which
prohibits the retention of any equity interest by the debtor over the interest of objecting
creditors, has made Chapter 11 plans for family farm operations extremely difficult to
confirm. See Norwest Bank v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988) (defining the absolute priority
rule as applied to farming operations). Similarly, creditors involved in a Chapter 12
bankruptcy do not have the § 1111(b) election that is available to creditors of Chapter 11
debtors. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (1988).
176. 11 U.S.C. § 109(f) provides: "Only a family farmer with regular annual income
may be a debtor under Chapter 12 of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 109(f) (1988).
177. For individuals, § 101(17XA) provides that a "family farmer" is:
[an] individual or individual and spouse engaged in a farming operation whose
aggregate debts do not exceed $1,500,000 and not less than 80 percent of whose
aggregate noncontingent, liquidated debts (excluding a debt for the principal
residence of such individual or such individual and spouse unless such debt arises
out of a farming operation), on the date the case is filed, arise out of a farming
operation owned or operated by such individual or such individual and spouse,
and such individual or such individual and spouse receive from such farming
operation more than 50 percent of such individual's or such individual and
spouse's gross income for the taxable year preceding the taxable year in which
the case concerning such individual or such individual and spouse was filed.
11 U.S.C. § 101(17XA) (1988).
178. For corporations and partnerships, § 101(17XB) provides that a "family farmer" is:
[a] corporation or partnership in which more than 50 percent of the
outstanding stock or equity is held by one family, or by one family and the
relatives of the members of such family, and such family or such relatives
conduct the farming operation, and
(i) more than 80 percent of the value of its assets consists of assets related to the
farming operation;
(ii) its aggregate debts do not exceed $1,500,000 and not less than 80 percent of
its aggregate noncontingent, liquidated debts (excluding a debt for one
dwelling which is owned by such corporation or partnership and which a
shareholder or partner maintains as a principal residence, unless such debt
arises out of a farming operation), on the date the case is filed, arise out of
the farming operation owned or operated by such corporation or such
partnership; and
(iii) if such corporation issues stock, such stock is not publicly traded.
11 U.S.C. § 101(17XB) (1988).
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meet the ownership and organization requirements. 17  The "reg-
ular annual income" requirement is defined as annual income that
is "sufficiently stable and regular to enable such family farmer to
make payments" under a Chapter 12 plan.'
The Eighth Circuit addressed the Chapter 12 eligibility issue
in the recent case of State Bank of Towner v. Edwards (In re
Edwards).'18 One of the issues presented was whether the debt-
ors' role as lessors constituted farming, an issue much debated by
the courts.'8 2 The court's finding on this issue was based on the
test adopted by the court in Otoe County National Bank v. Easton
(In re Easton).'8 According to this test, the debtor must have had
"a significant degree of engagement in, played some significant
operational role in, or had an ownership interest in the crop pro-
duction which took place on the acreage they rented."' 8 4 Apply-
ing this test, the court found that the evidence that the debtors
"had a significant role in crop production taking place on their
rented land" was sufficient to meet the definition of "family
farmer" for purposes of Chapter 12 eligibility.18 5
The court in In re Voelker 186 summarized an alternative test
179. 11 U.S.C. § 101(17) (1988).
180. 11 U.S.C. § 101(18) (1988).
181. 924 F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 1991).
182. The issue of whether the leasing of farmland is a farming activity and whether
rental payments can be considered as farm income for purposes of Chapter 12 eligibility
standards has been addressed by numerous courts. Much of this litigation references the
Seventh Circuit decision in the 1987 case ofln re Armstrong, 812 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 925 (1987). In this case, the majority held that for income to be
categorized as farm income, it must meet what has been termed the risk test. Its receipt
must be dependent upon the risk that is inherent in traditional farming operations. If it is
not, as in the case of cash rent for leased farmland, it is not farm income. Id. at 1028. The
dissent strongly rejected this mechanical approach and proposed a totality of the
circumstances test. Id. at 1031. Under the dissent's view, the debtor's overall situation
could be examined and an equitable result reached. Id. Since Armstrong, many lower
courts have lined up on one side or the other, with the majority appearing to reject the
Armstrong risk test. Cases that have followed the majority's approach in Armstrong
include: In re Krueger, 104 B.R. 223 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1988); In re Maschhoff, 89 B.R. 768
(Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1988); In re Seabloom, 78 B.R. 543 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1987); In re Haschke, 77
B.R. 223 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1987). Cases that have rejected the Armstrong majority include:
In re Vernon, 101 B.R. 87 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1989); In re Coulston, 98 B.R. 280 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1989); In re Hettinger, 95 B.R. 110 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1989); In re Jessen, 82 B.R. 490
(Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1988); In re Burke, 81 B.R. 971 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987); In re Rott, 73
B.R. 366 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1987). Note that subsequent to the opinions referenced above, the
Eighth Circuit rejected both the majority and the minority Armstrong opinions, declaring a
new test for the farm income determination. Otoe County Nat'l Bank v. Easton (In re
Easton), 883 F.2d 630, 636 (8th Cir. 1989).
183. 883 F.2d 630 (8th Cir. 1989). For a discussion of Easton and the Eighth Circuit's
treatment of Chapter 12 eligibility issues, see P. Maureen Bock-Dill, Note, Get Down and
Dirty: The Eighth Circuit's Admonition to Farmers Seeking the Protection of Chapter 12,
43 ARK. L. REV. 701 (1990).
184. Edwards, 924 F.2d at 799 n.4 (citing Easton, 883 F.2d at 636).
185. Edwards, 924 F.2d at 799.
186. 123 B.R. 749 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1990).
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for addressing the "family farmer" definition. The court first dis-
cussed the requirement that the debtor own or "operate" a farm-
ing operation. On this issue, it defined "operate" as meaning
"being actively involved in the day-to-day management" of the
business.'" 7 In turning to the issue of whether rental income is
farm income for purposes of Chapter 12 eligibility, the court relied
upon an analysis of six factors. These factors were:
1) whether the debtor's operation is a continuing one;
2) whether there is a physical presence of family mem-
bers on the farm;
3) whether the debtor owns traditional farm assets;
4) whether leasing out land is a form of scaling down the
previous farm operations;
5) the form of the lease; and
6) whether the debtor ceased all of its own investment
of labor and assets to produce crops or livestock.'88
Applying these factors to the facts in the Voelker case, the court
found the rental income to be farm income.' 8 9
Other cases addressing the definition of farming for purposes
of Chapter 12 eligibility have held that a sawmill was not a farm-
ing operation,1' ° that social security disability payments are
included in gross income for applying the farm income percentage
test,' 9 ' and that debt forgiveness, although categorized as "income
from discharge of indebtedness" for tax purposes, is not included
in gross income.' 9 2 In addition, when discussing the eligibility
determination, one court has held that when a debtor's eligibility
for Chapter 12 bankruptcy relief is challenged, the debtor has the
burden of proof to establish that he or she is eligible.' 93
C. CONFIRMATION STANDARDS FOR CHAPTER 12 PLANS
Another Chapter 12 issue that is frequently litigated is
whether the plan proposed by the debtor meets the requisite con-
187. In re Voelker, 123 B.R. 749, 751 (Bankr. ED. Mich. 1990) (quoting Exec. Order
No. 12138, 44 F.R. 29637 (1979)).
188. Id. at 752 (citation omitted).
189. Id. at 753.
190. See In re Miller, 122 B.R. 360, 365 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1990) (applying the
definition of "farming operation" set forth by the Eighth Circuit in Easton, 883 F.2d at 634,
and holding in part, that operating a sawmill is not a farming operation). Contra In re
Sugar Pine Ranch, 100 B.R. 28 (Bankr. D. Or. 1989).
191. See In re Koenegstein, 130 B.R. 281, 286 (Bankr. S.D. I11. 1991).
192. Id. at 287 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 61(aX12)). This holding is supported in part
because the Tax Code allows debt forgiveness income to be used to reduce net operating
loss to avoid its characterization as gross income.
193. See Voelker, 123 B.R. at 750.
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firmation standards. These standards are set forth in section 1225
of the Bankruptcy Code.19 4 With regard to secured claim holders,
section 1225 provides that absent secured claim holder accept-
ance, 195 the debtor's plan must either provide that each claim
holder retain the lien securing its claim and be paid an amount not
less than the amount of the secured claim or that the secured
property be surrendered to the claim holder. 9 The amount of
the secured claim is generally the value of the secured prop-
erty. 197 Thus, a plan can be confirmed over the objection of the
secured creditor if the plan provides for payment of the value of
the collateral as of the effective date of the plan. This obviously
gives rise to valuation disputes. Because in most cases the plan will
provide for payments to be made over time, however, it also gives
rise to disputes concerning the present value of the stream of pay-
ments promised in the plan. Central to these disputes is the issue
of what interest rate will provide the secured claim holder with
the requisite value of his of her claim. 198
In USDA v. Fisher (In re Fisher),199 perhaps the most signifi-
cant recent decision on the issue of Chapter 12 plan confirmation,
the Eighth Circuit rejected the confirmation of a Chapter 12 plan
on the grounds that it did not satisfy the confirmation require-
ments with respect to one of the secured claim holders, FmHA. At
issue was the interest rate promised under the plan, a rate based
on the weighted average of the debtors' original FmHA contract
rates of interest.2 °° In reaching its decision, the court addressed
two important confirmation issues: first, whether the plan can
apply the contract rate of interest to a restructured loan when the
contract rate is less that the current market rate, and second,
whether FmHA low interest loans can be restructured at lower
than market interest rates.20 '
In Fisher, under the plan proposed by the debtors and
accepted by both the bankruptcy court and the district court, the
debtors sought to restructure their secured obligation to FmHA
using the weighted average of their original contract rates of inter-
194. 11 U.S.C. § 1225 (1988).
195. 11 U.S.C. § 1225(aX5XA) (1988).
196. 11 U.S.C. § 1225(aX5) (1988).
197. 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1988).
198. For an overview of the different approaches used by the courts in determining an
acceptable interest rate under 1225(aX5), see Thomas 0. Depperschmidt & Nancy Hisey
Kratzke, The Search for the Proper Interest Rate Under Chapter 12 (Family Farmer
Bankruptcy Act) 67 N.D. L. REV. 455 (1991).
199. 930 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1991).
200. USDA v. Fisher (In re Fisher), 930 F.2d 1361, 1362 (8th Cir. 1991).
201. Id.
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est.20 2 The FmHA objected, claiming that the plan failed to satisfy
the Chapter 12 confirmation requirements that require that a
secured creditor be paid the present value of its secured claim.2 °3
The FmHA argued that for purposes of this requirement, present
value must be based on the market rate of interest, not the lower
FmHA loan rate.204 However, because of the FmHA's unique sta-
tus as provider of low interest loans to eligible farmers, the con-
tract rates on the Fishers' loans averaged out to be 5.41%, below
the "market rate" applicable to other lenders.20 5
In addressing the contract rate/market rate issue, the Eighth
Circuit agreed that the debtors' plan did not meet the confirma-
tion standards required by section 1225(aX5XB). 2°6 It held that the
requirement that secured creditors receive the value of their
secured claim did not allow for the unequal treatment of credi-
tors.20 7 The court interpreted section 1225(aX5XB) as requiring a
present value determination based on the current market rate, not
the contract rate originally agreed upon by the parties.20 Despite
the special purpose underlying FmHA financing, the court rea-
soned that "[h]aving filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 12, we
hold that FmHA enters the bankruptcy proceedings the same as
any other creditors and is thus entitled to have its claim valued
using a discount rate based not on the contract rate of interest but
on the 'market rate' of interest.
2 0 9
In reaching this decision, the court adopted the reasoning of
the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Arnold.210 Although not dis-
cussed by the court, there are also contrary decisions on this issue
holding that the market rate standard is to be applied only in cases
where the contract rate is a higher rate, indicating that if the con-
tract rate is lower, this lower rate would be acceptable.2 '
The court explicitly rejected the debtors' reliance on an ear-
202. Id. at 1361-62.
203. Id. at 1361 (referencing 11 U.S.C. § 1225(aX5XB) (West 1986)).
204. Id.
205. Fisher, 930 F.2d at 1362.
206. Id. at 1363.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. (citing 878 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1989)).
211. See, e.g., In re Turner, 87 B.R. 514, 517-18 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988); Federal Land
Bank v. Bartlesmeyer (In re Bartlesmeyer), 78 B.R. 975, 977 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987). See
also Hardzog v. Federal Land Bank (In re Hardzog), 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir. 1990)
("[I]n the absence of special circumstances, such as the market rate being higher than the
contract rate, Bankruptcy Courts should use the current market rate of interest used for
similar loans in the region.").
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lier Eighth Circuit decision, United States v. Doud.21 2 It stated
that Doud only addressed the issue of the method used to compute
market rate, not the contract rate issue.2 13 The Doud decision,
however, has been interpreted as allowing the use of the lower
contract rate. 214 This apparent misinterpretation stems from the
fact that although the appellate Doud decision only discussed the
market rate computation applicable to one of the debtors' loans, it
affirmed without discussion the lower court's holding that three of
the other loans must be left at the low interest FmHA contract
rate.2 15
On the second issue, the applicable market rate to be used for
FmHA loans, the court took a step back from the equal treatment
of creditors position. The court stated that the special status of the
FmHA may be relevant in determining what the applicable "mar-
ket rate" may be.21 '6 The FmHA argued that the rate should be
based on the same method used by the court for other creditors.
This method considers the value of the debtors' property and the
amount that the FmHA could collect if this value were deposited
in treasury notes. It then adds a risk factor percentage that reflects
the risk of default by the debtors.21 '7 The court was not inclined to
accept FmHA's reasoning on this issue, noting that the FmHA was
required to sell its inventory land to local farmers.21 ' Thus, the
court indicated that the proper "market rate" should be defined
by the rate that the FmHA could expect to receive if it sold the
debtors' property to local farmers. Because evidence on this point
had not been presented, the court remanded the case for a deter-
mination of the appropriate market rate of interest.21 In other
decisions addressing the interest rate component of confirmation
standards for Chapter 12 plans, the courts have rejected five per-
cent and seven percent rates.220  Nevertheless, courts have
approved a twelve percent rate221 and approved a rate set accord-
212. 869 F.2d 1144 (8th Cir. 1989).
213. Fisher, 930 F.2d at 1363.
214. Bartlesmeyer, 78 B.R. at 977.
215. For a discussion of the lower court's analysis on this issue, see Matter of Doud, 74
B.R. 865, 870 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987).
216. Fisher, 930 F.2d at 1364.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See, e.g., In re Mason, 129 B.R. 990, 991-92 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1991) (rejecting the
"cramdown interest rates" of 7% and 5% as not providing the secured creditors the present
value of their claims for purposes of Chapter 12 confirmation).
221. See In re Foos, 121 B.R. 778, 781 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) (finding that a fixed rate
of 12% per annum, the applicable rate for a similar loan made today, is the appropriate rate
for a Chapter 12 plan of reorganization).
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ing to the interest rate currently paid on Treasury Bonds, plus a
two percent risk factor.
222
Section 1225 also contains specific confirmation standards that
apply to the debtor's unsecured claims. The plan must provide
that the value of assets to be distributed under the plan to each
unsecured claim holder is not less than the amount that would be
paid on such claim if the estate were liquidated under a Chapter 7
bankruptcy.223 In other words, this requirement, termed either
the "best interest of creditors" test or the "liquidation" test,
224
requires that unsecured creditors receive at least as much under
the plan as they would receive under a liquidation. 22 5 The courts
are thus required to determine what assets should be included in
this hypothetical liquidation and when the valuation of the
included assets should occur.226 These issues have also produced
much litigation.
In addressing these issues, some courts have held that the
appropriate valuation date should be the effective date of the plan
and that all assets in existence at that time would be valued.227
The recent case of In re Foos221 rejected this in so far as it called
for the inclusion of post-petition assets. The Foos court agreed that
the best interests test requires a valuation of assets as of the effec-
tive date of the plan, presumably the date of confirmation, but it
held that only assets that were property of the estate as of the
222. See In re Koch, 131 B.R. 128, 133-34 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1991) (holding that an
interest rate determined by the treasury bond rate with a two percent risk factor increase is
permissible; also holding that the duration of repayment terms on a restructured loan must
adhere to the customary lending practices in order to meet Chapter 12 confirmation
standards and accepting the "creative approach" of an extended amortization period with
an intermediate balloon payment requirement).
223. 11 U.S.C. § 1225(aX4) (1988).
224. Under Chapter 12, the requirement is set forth at 11 U.S.C. § 1225(aX4) (1988).
The same requirement exists under Chapters 11 and 13 at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(aX7) and
1325(aX4) (1988), respectively.
225. Id.
226. Most of the recently reported decisions interpreting this requirement have been
Chapter 12 cases and have focused on the timing of liquidation analysis, with the majority
choosing the date of confirmation. See, e.g. First Nat'l Bank v. Hopwood ( In re Hopwood),
124 B.R. 82, 83 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (holding that the appropriate time for evaluating the best
interests test is the date of plan confirmation); Gribbons v. Federal Land Bank, 106 B.R.
113, 115 (W.D. Ky. 1989) (same); In re Lupfer Bros., 120 B.R. 1002, 1004 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1990) (same); In re Musil, 99 B.R. 448, 450 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1988) (same); In re Bluridg
Farms, Inc., 93 B.R. 648, 656 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1988) (same); In re Perdue, 95 B.R. 475, 477
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1988) (same). But see In re Neilsen, 86 B.R. 177, 179 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.
1988) (holding that the test is to be applied as of the filing date); In re Foos, 121 B.R. 778,
783 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) (holding that the correct date for valuation is the effective date
of the plan, but that the only assets that are to be considered are those in existence as of
filing).
227. In re Bremer, 104 B.R. 999, 1002-07 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989).
228. 121 B.R. 778 (S.D. Ohio 1990).
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bankruptcy filing were to be valued.229 The court based its hold-
ing on the fact that a true Chapter 7 liquidation would only
encompass assets belonging to the estate as of filing under section
54 1.230 Thus, the court observed that unharvested crops could be
excluded from the best interests analysis. With regard to a farm
program contract that was also at issue, the court noted that evi-
dence had not been presented at the confirmation hearing on
whether the debtor's right to receive future payments was part of
the section 541 estate.23' If this right was property of the estate,
the value of the payments, as of the effective date of the plan,
would have to be included in the liquidation analysis.232
Other decisions on this issue include In re Braxton 233 and First
National Bank v. Hopwood (In re Hopwood).2 34 In Braxton, the
debtor's plan was not confirmed because the court found insuffi-
cient evidence to establish that the debtor met the liquidation
test.235 In Hopwood, the court confirmed that the correct date for
comparing the liquidation value of the property and the amount to
be distributed under the Chapter 12 plan to unsecured creditors is
the effective date of the plan.236
In addition to the liquidation test, unsecured creditors may
also be entitled to receive payments from all projected disposable
income over the life of the plan.237 As such, courts have been
called upon to interpret both this requirement and the meaning of
the term "disposable income."
In In re Wood,238 the court held that Chapter 12 debtors have
an affirmative duty to make all payments required under the plan,
including payments made under the plan provision that requires
payment of disposable income to unsecured creditors. 239  The
court further held that the trustee need not seek modification of
the plan in order to compel this payment of disposable income.24 °
229. In re Foos, 121 B.R. 778, 781-84 (S.D. Ohio 1990).
230. Id. at 782-83.
231. Id. at 784.
232. Id.
233. 124 B.R. 870, 874 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1991) (refusing to confirm a Chapter 12 plan
in part because the farmers failed to present sufficient evidence that the proposed plan
would offer unsecured creditors as much as they would receive on liquidation or that the
plan was feasible).
234. 124 B.R. 82, 85 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
235. In re Braxton, 124 B.R. 870, 874 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1991).
236. First Nat'l Bank v. Hopwood (In re Hopwood), 124 B.R. 82, 85 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
But see In re Nielsen, 86 B.R. 177, 178 (E.D. Mo. 1988).
237. 11 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1988).
238. 122 B.R. 107 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990).
239. In re Wood, 122 B.R. 107, 111 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990).
240. Id. at 112.
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While the trustee may have the burden of going forward with evi-
dence as to the existence of disposable income, the debtor has the
ultimate burden of persuasion.2 4' As to the definition of disposable
income, the court noted that when determining reasonable
expenses, both those amounts already expended and those neces-
sary for future operations must be considered, that capital expend-
itures are not unreasonable expenses as a matter of law, and
whether it is reasonable to require the debtor to seek operating
credit as opposed to using cash for operating expenses will depend
on the facts of the case.2 42  The court held that an analysis of dis-
posable income depends on actual expenses and income figures,
not budget projections.243 Applying this standard, the court found
that on the facts of the case, the debtors had no disposable income
for distribution.244
Another issue that has generated litigation concerning plan
confirmation is the compensation afforded to the bankruptcy
trustee.2 45 Chapter 12 is set up to fund the trustee's compensation
through the plan payments. The trustee is to collect a percentage
fee from payments made by the debtor under the plan.246 The
issue that has been raised is whether this percentage must be
assessed against all payments made by the debtor. Several recent
cases have addressed this issue.
One recent court noted that there is a presumption in the
Code favoring trustee administration of all plan payments.2 47 That
court held, however, that a one time cash collateral payment could
be paid directly to the impaired creditor and that this direct pay-
ment would avoid the trustee's fee.2 48 The factors the court con-
sidered included the extent of other payments, the impact on the
total amount of trustees compensation, the ease of verification of
241. Id.
242. Id. at 115-16.
243. Id. at 117.
244. Id. at 118-19. See also In re Fleshman, 123 B.R. 842,846-47 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1990) (holding that a Chapter 12 plan, confirmed over the objection of unsecured creditors,
must be construed to require payment of all disposable income to unsecured creditors;
calculation of disposable income involves a subjective analysis of what expenses are
reasonably necessary; and debtors' motion to pay disposable income to secured creditors is
denied); In re Martin, 130 B.R. 951, 964-66 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1991) (finding that life
insurance proceeds became income for purposes of "disposable income" analysis).
245. For an excellent article explaining Chapter 12 trustee compensation, see Janet
Flaccus, Bankruptcy Trustee's Compensation: An Issue of Court Control, November 1991
(available from Professor Flaccus, University of Arkansas School of Law, Fayetteville, AR
72701).
246. In most districts, 28 U.S.C. § 586(e) (1988) governs. In districts in which the U.S.
Trustee system is not in effect, 11 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (1988) controls.
247. In re Seamons, 131 B.R. 459, 462 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1991).
248. Id.
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whether the payment has been made, the sophistication of lender,
the lender's consent to the direct payment, and debtors' diligence,
cooperation and good faith.249
The court in In re Golden 250 held that the debtor could make
direct payments to creditors who are legally sophisticated and who
have consented to the plan.25' Whether payments are made
through the trustee or paid directly to the creditor, however, the
court held that the trustee is entitled to a commission on all claims
modified by the Chapter 12 plan.252
In contrast, the court in Fulkrod v. Barmettler (In re Ful-
krod) 25 3 took a more liberal approach. The court held that while
the statutory trustee's fee must be assessed against all payments
made by the trustee, and the trustee should generally disburse all
payments on impaired claims, a contrary plan provision providing
for the payment of an impaired claim directly by the debtor may
be permissible. 5 4 The court stated that whether such a plan pro-
vision is appropriate is dependent upon the sound discretion of the
court. 2
55
D. OTHER ISSUES IN CHAPTER 12 BANKRUPTCY
In addition to the critical issues of eligibility for relief under
Chapter 12 and confirmation of a Chapter 12 plan, the courts have
addressed a variety of other issues in Chapter 12 bankruptcies.
For example, the Eighth Circuit addressed the issue of whether a
debtor can be ordered to make preconfirmation payments to a
creditor.256 The court held that although these payments were
not specifically authorized by the Code, the bankruptcy court has
the discretion to make such an order.257
Several courts addressed the issue of modification of a Chapter
12 plan. For example, the Second Circuit held that the modifica-
tion of a confirmed Chapter 12 plan to allow for the sale of a nega-
tive easement restricting the use of the land to agricultural use was
permissible.258 The court based its decision on the bankruptcy
249. Id.
250. 131 B.R. 201 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1991).
251. In re Golden, 131 B.R. 201, 204 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1991).
252. Id. at 203-04.
253. 126 B.R. 584 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991).
254. Fulkrod v. Barmettler (In re Fulkrod), 126 B.R. 584, 588 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991).
Accord Overholt v. Farm Credit Servs. (In re Overholt), 125 B.R. 202, 211-12 (S.D. Ohio
1990).
255. Id.
256. Stahn v. Haeckel, 920 F.2d 555, 557 (8th Cir. 1990).
257. Id.
258. Abele v. Webb (In re Webb), 932 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1991).
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court's finding that the sale increased the feasibility of the plan
and was in fact in the best interest of the creditors. 25 9
The court in In re Larson,2 60 held that the allowance of a
Chapter 12 plan modification does not require proof of a change in
circumstance as a basis for the proposed modification. However,
the modified plan must meet the same confirmation standards as
the original plan.26 1 On the facts of the Larson case, the debtors'
motion for plan modification was denied for failure to show feasi-
bility and failure to provide secured creditors with the present
value of their secured claims.262
One final Chapter 12 issue addressed by several courts is the
issue of successive bankruptcy filings. The courts appear to agree
that there is no per se rule against such filing, but they direct their
analysis to whether the filing meets the good faith standard. 263 In
addition, some courts have found that a change in circumstances
must be shown to justify the most recent filing.26 4
IV. DISCHARGEABILITY, DISMISSAL, SANCTIONS AND
FRAUD
As is the case with non-farm debtors, farmers who file for
relief in bankruptcy and abuse the system by acting in bad faith or
committing fraud are frequently scorned by the bankruptcy
courts. Although the agricultural connection in many of the deci-
sions on these issues is irrelevant, several agricultural cases can be
highlighted to emphasize the seriousness of this abuse of process.
259. Id. at 157.
260. 122 B.R. 417 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1991).
261. In re Larson, 122 B.R. 417, 420 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1991).
262. Id. at 420-21.
263. See, e.g., Schuldies v. United States (In re Schuldies), 122 B.R. 100 (D. S.D. 1990)
(holding that the bankruptcy court must examine the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the successive filing of bankruptcy proceedings to determine whether the
debtor has acted in good faith for purposes of eligibility for relief; there is no per se rule
against successive filings; bad faith warranting dismissal of the bankruptcy can be found
either in the filing of the bankruptcy or the proposal of the plan).
264. See In re Henke, 127 B.R. 255 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1991) (holding that the filing of
successive bankruptcies is not per se bad faith, but the court must examine the filings
together to determine whether the statutory requirements, including good faith
requirements are met; also holding that a substantial or unexpected change in
circumstances must be shown to justify filing of Chapter 12 during performance under
confirmed chapter 11 plan); In re Miller, 122 B.R. 360 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1990) (holding that
while there is not a per se rule against successive bankruptcy filings, successive filing may
not meet the good faith test if debtors cannot show a "genuine need" for new bankruptcy
relief; successive filing may not meet the good faith test if sole purpose for refiling is to
renegotiate previously agreed upon plan); In re Fuhrman, 118 B.R. 72 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1990) (holding that the refiling of a Chapter 12 petition shortly after a prior dismissal places
a burden on the debtors to establish that their situation has changed; also holding that prior
findings are presumed to be correct and cannot be relitigated).
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In cases where fraud is found, the court will deny the debtor
discharge, either of the relevant debt 265 or of all debts. 266 For
example, in Frieouf v. United States (In re Frieouf),26 7 the Tenth
Circuit found that the evidence established that the Chapter 11
farm debtor acted in bad faith and in a manner that was prejudi-
cial to his creditors. As such, the court held that the bankruptcy
court was justified in denying the debtor a discharge of the debts
otherwise dischargeable in his case for a period of three years.268
The court found, however, that the bankruptcy court was not
authorized to .deny the debtor access to bankruptcy for longer
than the 180-day period specified in section 349(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.269 Although the access to bankruptcy issue has not
been addressed in other recent agricultural bankruptcy cases, sev-
eral cases have denied or revoked the discharge of debt because of
a finding of fraud.2 10
Chapter 12 contains a provision specifically authorizing the
court, on request of a party in interest, to convert a pending Chap-
ter 12 case to a Chapter 7 liquidation upon a finding of fraud.27'
This powerful provision has been used in several cases to convert a
case, despite the debtor's motion to dismiss the case.272 Section
1208(b) gives the debtor this right to dismiss the Chapter 12 bank-
265. 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX2) (1988).
266. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1988).
267. 938 F.2d 1099 (10th Cir. 1991).
268. Frieouf v. United States (In re Frieouf), 938 F.2d 1099, 1105 (10th Cir. 1991).
269. Id. at 1104 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 349(a) (1988)).
270. Other recent cases on the denial of discharge in agricultural bankruptcies include:
Abbott Bank-Hemingford v. Armstrong (In re Armstrong), 931 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the issue of fraud in the conversion of nonexempt assets to exempt assets is a
question of fact for the bankruptcy court and that it will not be overturned unless clearly
erroneous; in order to find fraudulent use of an exemption, indicia of fraud must be found;
factors indicating that fraud may exist include conduct designed to mislead or deceive
creditor, use of credit to purchase exemption, conversion of a substantial amount of
property combined with fraudulent intent, the existence of conveyances for less than
adequate consideration; issue of intent to defraud for purposes of denying discharge is also
question of fact that will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous; fraudulent intent is
presumed in cases in which the debtor gratuitously conveys valuable property; in this case,
the bankruptcy court holding that the exemptions were allowed, but that discharge was
denied was affirmed); Holder v. Bennett (In re Bennett), 126 B.R. 869 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1991) (revoking discharge in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy where the debtors received post-
petition patronage dividends from a cotton cooperative based on pre-petition farming
activities and refused to turn the same over to the trustee as property of the estate); John
Deere Co. v. Myers (In re Myers), 124 B.R. 735 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (denying the
discharge of debt under § 523(a) where the debtor submitted a financial statement nine
days before filing bankruptcy showing a net worth of $2.4 million more that the bankruptcy
schedules revealed). But see In re French, 127 B.R. 434 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991) (debtor may
not be denied discharge in bankruptcy for valid assertion of Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination at First Meeting of Creditors).
271. 11 U.S.C. § 1208(d) (1988).
272. Graven v. Fink (In re Graven), 936 F.2d 378 (8th Cir. 1991); Foster v. North Texas
Production Credit Ass'n (In re Foster), 121 B.R. 961 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990) affirmed by,
945 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1991) (Table No. 91-1039).
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ruptcy "at any time.1273 However, when confronted with these
seemingly conflicting provisions, two circuit courts have affirmed
decisions that held that the right of the bankruptcy court to con-
vert the case prevails over the debtor's right to dismiss.2 74 These
courts have held that when the facts show that the debtors have
abused the legal and the bankruptcy process through fraud, the
bankruptcy court has the authority to convert a Chapter 12 bank-
ruptcy to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, even though the
debtor has moved to dismiss the Chapter 12 case. The courts have
found that section 1208(b) does not provide the debtor with an
absolute and immediate right to dismiss the case. When fraud is
shown the court can delay action on this motion while considering
other motions, such as one to convert the case because of fraud.275
V. CONCLUSION
The competition for scarce assets that is apparent in bank-
ruptcy produces complex litigation of bankruptcy and nonban-
kruptcy law issues. This is particularly apparent in bankruptcy
cases that affect agricultural interests, as these cases must construe
not only bankruptcy law, but interpret specific aspects of agricul-
tural law. This article attempted to highlight some of the most sig-
nificant cases in this area. It is hoped that it will be helpful to those
confronting these issues in future cases.
273. 11 U.S.C. § 1208(b) (1988).
274. Id.
275. Id.
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